9月12日0时至24时，31个省（自治区、直辖市）和新疆生产建设兵团报告新增本土确诊病例188例，含39例由无症状感染者转为确诊病例。         Wind turbines operate at a wind farm in Burqin County, Altay Prefecture, Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, on July 25, 2026. Photo: VCG
In economics, overcapacity is a dynamic and relative concept. Supply-demand balance is temporary, and imbalance is the norm. The Western narrative that equates the sheer scale of China's production capacity directly with "overcapacity" is, frankly, economically illiterate. It conflates size with pathology.
Consider the math. China's manufacturing sector accounts for roughly 30 percent of global manufacturing value-added - a dominance unmatched since the post-war US. Yet this reflects not overcapacity but competitive capacity. The critics ignore that China's trade surplus in 2025 reached a record $1.2 trillion, roughly equivalent to the GDP of a top-20 economy like Saudi Arabia. They ignore that Chinese exports carry high import content - foreign value-added accounts for nearly half of gross export value - meaning China's capacity integrates global supply chains rather than displacing them.
The judgment lacks rigor because it applies a static snapshot to a dynamic system. It assumes that if China produces more than it currently consumes domestically, the surplus is automatically "overcapacity." Nonsense. By that logic, Germany's persistent trade surplus in automobiles and machinery would constitute chronic overcapacity. It does not, because German capacity serves global demand. So does China's. The narrative isn't economics. It's politics dressed in economic jargon.
Western critics attribute the price advantages of Chinese green technology products to "government subsidies" and "market distortion." This is a convenient story. It is also wrong. The global competitiveness of China's green technology industries stems from four interconnected factors: massive domestic market scale, decades of sustained infrastructure investment, a highly educated STEM workforce, and fierce intra-industry competition. China's NEV purchase-tax exemptions, extended through 2027, total approximately 520 billion yuan ($77.05 billion). Substantial? Yes. But causally linked to overcapacity? No.
The causal chain critics imagine - subsidies → artificial competitiveness → overproduction - collapses under scrutiny. The EU's IPCEI battery programs allocated over 6 billion euros, plus EIB financing. The US CHIPS Act appropriated $54.2 billion for semiconductors, while the Inflation Reduction Act funnels hundreds of billions into clean energy. All major economies subsidize strategic industries. The difference is that China converted subsidies into systemic efficiency: its nominal lithium-ion cell capacity reached approximately 2.2 TWh by end-2023, driving global average battery pack prices down 20 percent year-on-year to $115 per kilowatt-hour in 2024. That is not distortion. That's innovation at scale.
Chinese firms filed 20,081 European patent applications in 2024 - 10.1 percent of the total, with battery technology patents surging 79 percent year-on-year. Patents reflect innovation, not subsidy dependency. The causal link between subsidies and overcapacity is weak; the link between scale, innovation, and competitiveness is robust.
Meanwhile, global demand for green and low-carbon transition is experiencing explosive growth. The International Energy Agency projects that renewable capacity additions must triple by 2030 to meet Paris Agreement targets. In this context, labeling China's wind, photovoltaic, and battery capacity as "overcapacity" is not merely wrong - it is dangerously counterproductive.
In fact, China's capacity has played an indispensable role in advancing the global energy transition. Chinese solar module production costs have fallen roughly 90 percent over the past decade. Goldman Sachs Research notes that China manufactured approximately 86 percent of global solar modules, 80 percent of lithium-ion batteries, and 68 percent of electric vehicles in 2024. This is not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets; it is capacity the world desperately needs.
The "overcapacity" label assumes a zero-sum game where Chinese production crowds out others. The reality is synergistic: Chinese capacity lowers global clean energy costs, enabling faster deployment worldwide. The "overcapacity" label holds only if one believes the world should slow decarbonization to protect less competitive producers and to empower those that deliberately employ "burn, baby, burn" tactics. That's industrial protectionism intersecting with brown imperialism, and it's disproportionately impacting the Global South, which is more vulnerable to climate breakdown, precisely when it's finally trying to shake off centuries of systemic Western exploitation and suppression.
Furthermore, the disparity in how the West treats its own industrial policy versus China's is glaring. When the US funnels $52.7 billion through the CHIPS Act for semiconductors, or when the EU subsidizes Airbus, or when American agricultural subsidies distort global food markets, the silence from Western media is deafening. When China gains an edge in manufacturing, it faces media offensives and policy restrictions.
This is not inconsistency. This is strategy. The underlying motivation is the "China threat" rubric - a framework that treats China's development itself as a danger to the Western-led order. Countries wagging their fingers at China do so not because China violates economic rules they themselves follow, but because China succeeds under rules they once wrote to their own advantage.
These accusers possess their own national industrial policies and subsidies. They have long exploited historical and contemporary advantages against China and developing countries. They have not competed well, have not provided themselves with good governance, and have not invested adequately in their own infrastructure, education, and R&D. They have allowed their own leading industries to seek monopolistic positions detrimental not only to others but to their own consumers. Rather than reform themselves, they blame China.
In these contexts, the cry of "China Shock 2.0" is the latest iteration of an old playbook: frame China's development as a threat to global stability rather than a contribution to global progress. The claim that China's advances in renewable energy and AI will send more serious shock waves than traditional manufacturing displacement is analytically flawed and politically motivated.
First, the premise is false. China is not reducing the market share of developed countries through unfair means; it is outcompeting them through innovation, scale, and efficiency. According to Goldman Sachs Research, China's "new three" green technology sectors alone contributed around one percentage point to the country's 5.4 percent nominal export growth in 2025. This is competitive capacity serving global demand, not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets.
Second, the "shock" framing ignores history. China maintained production and trade flows in 2020 while major Western economies crashed, providing essential goods to global markets, likely saving millions of lives while mitigating what would have been greater global economic harm. The "shock" is not to the global economy; it is to Western complacency.
Third, the argument is self-contradictory. The critics want China to be simultaneously weak enough to dismiss and strong enough to fear. If China's high-tech development is genuinely formidable - so innovative and efficient that it threatens to displace developed economies - then it is delivering precisely the technological progress the world needs to meet climate goals. Restricting it through tariffs and barriers would harm global innovation, raise energy costs for developing countries, and slow decarbonization. The critics would be sacrificing the planet to protect their own complacency.
"China Shock 2.0" is a rhetorical device to justify protectionism. It replaces engagement with containment, competition with confrontation. The world does not need another shock doctrine. It needs cooperation, investment, and the recognition that China's rise is not a threat but an opportunity - for green transition, for technological progress, for shared prosperity, and for a shared future. 
The author is a professor of politics and international relations and director of the Center for Ecological Civilization at East China Normal University in Shanghai. [email protected] 
。新增本土无症状感染者727例。成都新增病例已降至50例以下9月13日下午，据成都市举行的疫情防控工作新闻发布会介绍，9月12日0时至24时，成都新增本土确诊病例18例，另有11例既往通报的无症状感染者转确诊，新增本土无症状感染者26例。

二 | 成都新增感染者人数自8月26日开始呈现上升趋势，8月29日到达峰值后逐步下降，从9月8日开始每日新增病例都在100例以下，近两天新增病例已降至50例以下，疫情形势整体向好。发布会表示，9月6日成都发布社会面清零攻坚行动通告，实行分区分类分级管理。成都市社会面清零攻坚行动稳步推进，青白江、新津、都江堰、彭州、邛崃、崇州、大邑7个区（市）县作为第一批次于9月7日恢复了正常生产生活秩序；之后，又先后根据疫情形势，成都东部新区、温江区、蒲江县，四川天府新区、成都高新区西区、郫都区（不含团结街道）、简阳市、金堂县也逐步恢复了正常生产生活秩序。从9月1日以来，成都已顺利进行11轮全员核酸检测。

三 | 总体来看，虽然成都目前新增报告病例数呈波动下降趋势，但每日仍有社会面检出病例，全市防控措施仍不能松懈。发布会介绍，本轮疫情自8月29日以来，每日新增病例不断下降，总体疫情形势向好发展。贵阳新增感染者人数仍处高位9月13日，据贵阳贵安新冠肺炎疫情防控新闻发布会介绍，9月12日0时至24时，贵阳全市新增新冠肺炎无症状感染者118例，累计报告确诊病例16例，无症状感染者475例，已解除医学隔离观察8例。

四 | 当前，贵阳市新增新冠肺炎阳性感染者人数还处在高位运行，疫情防控形势依然严峻复杂，正处在吃劲的关键时期。为严防疫情传播，切实保障在校人员健康安全，9月12日，乌当区将贵阳乐湾国际实验学校在校学生全部转运至贵州饭店、世纪金源酒店进行集中隔离健康监测，校内其他相关人员，在乌当区隔离酒店进行集中隔离健康监测，所有人员安全顺利进入酒店。

五 | 三亚解除部分片区临时静态管理9月13日，据三亚市新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情防控工作指挥部新闻发布会介绍，9月12日0时至24时，三亚新增阳性感染者1例，为无症状感染者且在隔离管控中发现，社会面未发现阳性感染者。自9月5日起，已连续8天未在社会面发现阳性感染者，每日新增感染者数量均为个位数，疫情已经得到有效控制。9月13日，三亚市新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情防控工作指挥部发布通告，自2022年9月13日12时起，解除中心城区内部分片区临时静态管理。在管控措施上，恢复农业等生产活动，开放超市、商场、理发店、餐馆（不开放堂食）等经营场所，开放室外公共场所，准予快递、外卖运营，私家车、出租车、网约车等正常通行。暂不开放影院、酒吧、KTV、网吧、棋牌室等室内密闭经营场所，暂不开放农贸市场，暂不开放渔业生产。

六 | 保留社区（村、居）进出卡口，人员凭48小时内核酸阴性证明、扫地点码、测温在片区内通行。人员、车辆不出三亚、不跨片区。三河市昨日开展为期4天静默管理9月13日，三河市应对新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情防控工作领导小组办公室发布通告，2022年9月13日6时起，对三河全域开展为期4天的静默管理，并连续开展4轮全员核酸检测。通告称，保持区域相对静止。对出入市域的道路、汽车站等实行交通管制，所有客运班线、出租车、公交车等暂停运营。

七 | 市域内承担疫情防控、安全生产、应急抢险、城市运转、医疗救治、民生保障、值班值守等紧要任务确需外出的，持有效证件出入，其他车辆和人员严禁上路通行。做到非必要不流动。全市实行静默管理，各村街、居民小区只保留1个出入口，由村委会（社区）和责任单位实行24小时值班值守，居民除特殊情况外一律不得外出，确有应急就医需求的，可及时联系所在村街（社区）。各级机关事业单位、医疗机构除承担疫情防控任务的人员外，其他人员一律居家办公。暂停有关经营活动。全市除民生保障、物资保供等维护社会基本运行和核心功能的单位外，其他经营场所一律暂停开放或经营。

八 | 大庆近3日新增病例数逐渐下降9月13日，据大庆市政府新闻办疫情防控新闻发布会介绍，9月12日0时至24时，大庆市新增本土无症状感染者18例，当日治愈出院和解除医学观察89例。

九 | 大庆市近3日新增病例数逐渐下降。

十 | 对于近期大庆高校学生何时能够返校的问题，发布会介绍，当前，大庆市疫情防控形势严峻复杂，萨尔图区（高新区）、让胡路区、龙凤区目前仍实施静态管理措施。随着高校陆续开学，部分学生需要离庆返校入学。省、市指挥部高度重视学生离庆返校工作，安排教育部门成立工作专班，开通服务热线，及时掌握学生需求情况，对主城区大学生居住地分布、就读省内外高校情况进行排查统计，积极与省教育厅、省内外各高校对接，了解掌握学生返校地疫情防控相关政策和入学要求。为严防疫情外溢，保障学生离庆前、返校途中和到校后疫情防控安全，经过专家组综合研判，采取分类返校措施：中高风险地区居住学生不安排返校。按照省教育厅安排，主城区省内高校就读学生暂缓返校。文/本报记者 李铁柱统筹/蒋朔 供图/视觉中国