心理追凶

中俄亮出“敌国条款”！必要时可动用五常特权，高市早苗傻眼了,犀牛老师观点,原创 中俄亮出“敌国条款”！必要时可动用五常特权，高市早苗傻眼了_我的网站

A |     《联合国宪章》至今保留着针对二战战败国的特殊条款，也就是俗称的“敌国条款”。宪章第53条和第107条明文规定：一旦二战战败国再度推行侵略政策，联合国创始成员国无需经过安理会授权，就能直接对其采取军事行动。

B |     (ECNS) -- U.S. restrictions on Chinese companies over alleged “forced labor” are facing growing scrutiny, both over the facts behind such accusations and the legal procedures used to enforce them.    Recently, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), under the Department of Homeland Security, updated its records to remove Hoshine Silicon (Jia Xing) Co., Ltd., a Chinese photovoltaic supply-chain company, from the scope of a Withhold Release Order (WRO) related to alleged forced labor in Xinjiang.        Li Guogang, senior legal counsel at Tahota Law Firm who represented Hoshine Silicon, told China News Network that this is the first known case of a Chinese company being removed from the scope of such a U.S. enforcement measure related to Xinjiang. He described it as a milestone for Chinese companies seeking to challenge U.S. actions involving alleged forced labor.    From being targeted to having to prove its innocence    In recent years, the U.S. has repeatedly used WROs and Xinjiang-related legislation to impose trade restrictions on Chinese companies.    For businesses caught up in such enforcement measures, proving that their products and supply chains are not connected to alleged forced labor can become a major hurdle.    The Hoshine case highlights the difficult burden placed on companies facing such measures. Rather than authorities being required to disclose the full basis for their allegations through a transparent process, affected companies may find themselves having to submit extensive evidence to demonstrate that the accusations against them are unfounded.    “We submitted 4,000 to 5,000 pages of materials, including audit results and detailed explanations of the supply chain, to demonstrate that the allegations of forced labor against Hoshine Silicon were without factual basis,” Li said.    The company’s experience also shows how difficult it can be for businesses to challenge such enforcement actions. According to Li, U.S. customs authorities initially rejected Hoshine Silicon’s applications for removal twice.    The situation changed after the company took the case to the U.S. Court of International Trade. The dispute subsequently moved through judicial proceedings, and the enforcement measure was eventually lifted as it applied to Hoshine Silicon.    The shift from administrative enforcement to judicial review is significant. It shows that when allegations lack sufficient factual support, legal procedures can still provide companies with an important avenue to seek relief and challenge government decisions.    The significance goes beyond one company    The significance of the Hoshine case lies in more than one company being removed from the scope of a U.S. trade restriction.    In recent years, U.S. restrictions on Chinese companies have expanded far beyond traditional tariffs, extending into supply chains, investment, technology and national security. Issues involving Xinjiang and alleged military ties have also increasingly become part of Washington’s economic policy toolkit toward China.    One direct result is greater uncertainty for Chinese companies seeking to enter or operate in the U.S. market. Businesses must consider not only product prices, quality and competitiveness, but also the additional risks created by shifts in U.S. domestic politics and regulatory policy.    China’s Ministry of Commerce has repeatedly stated that Xinjiang enjoys social stability, economic development and improving living standards, and that there is no forced labor of any kind in the region.    A recent case involving Chinese pharmaceutical and life-sciences company WuXi AppTec offers another example worth watching. The company has also challenged its designation by the U.S. Department of Defense as a “Chinese military company.”    A U.S. court recently granted WuXi AppTec a preliminary injunction, temporarily blocking the designation while the case proceeds. The court found that the company was likely to succeed in arguing that the Defense Department’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, pointing to problems in how some of the evidence had been interpreted.    From Xinjiang-related restrictions to military-related designations, the U.S. government has increasingly brought political and national-security considerations into its treatment of Chinese companies.    When political tools are repeatedly used to blacklist Chinese businesses, the consequences go beyond the outcome of a single lawsuit. They can also affect global companies’ confidence in the predictability of the U.S. market and its legal and regulatory environment.    If companies must spend enormous amounts of time and money simply to demonstrate that allegations against them lack sufficient evidence, questions inevitably arise over whether confidence in U.S. market rules and legal institutions can be sustained.    Commercial rules ultimately depend on institutions that are stable, transparent and predictable.    When administrative power increasingly intervenes in normal international trade, and when market risks depend more heavily on political judgments, the impact extends beyond one company or one supply chain. It can shape global businesses’ long-term expectations of the stability and reliability of the U.S. market.    The cases of Hoshine Silicon and WuXi AppTec have therefore opened more than a gap in individual blacklists. They have exposed a potential crack in the broader machinery of U.S. sanctions and restrictions.    When allegations fail to withstand legal scrutiny and enforcement actions lack sufficient factual support, the credibility of those measures inevitably comes into question.    For Chinese companies, the message from these cases is clear: being placed under a U.S. restriction does not necessarily mark the end of the story. Evidence, legal procedures and judicial review can still challenge administrative decisions — and, in doing so, expose weaknesses in U.S. enforcement actions driven more by political considerations than by solid evidence.    (By Gong Weiwei)                            。    这两条关键条文从未被删除，而日本为此折腾了整整70年，始终没能将其废除。如今中俄同步亮出这张法理底牌，直接让高市早苗政府陷入无解的被动局面。    近期中俄接连公开表态，重申“敌国条款”的法律效力。8月17日，俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫在公开场合表示，《联合国宪章》始终把日本视为二战中的“敌人”，敦促日本认真研究宪章第107条。        他说，日本当年是承认军国主义罪行，并且完全接受《联合国宪章》之后才加入联合国的，现在日本政界想突破宪法限制、违反国际法、推卸历史责任的做法，已经引起了国际社会的高度警觉。    仅仅隔了两天，也就是8月19日中国外交部发言人林剑就在记者会上明确表态，中方完全赞同拉夫罗夫的相关发言。林剑直接点名批评了高市早苗政府，认为它故意回避、拒绝承认历史上侵略行为，并且一味地放弃和平主义、违反宪法和国际法、加快军事松绑进程，是对战后国际秩序的一种公然挑衅。

C |     中俄在同步就“敌国条款”发声、形成法理呼应，是近年极为罕见的姿态。这个时间节点并不是偶然发生的，普京在8月13日登上南千岛群岛之后，中俄两国驻日大使联合发表署名文章，中俄对于日本的法理制衡已经由幕后隐形联动转为台前公开亮剑。

D |         所谓“敌国条款”，本质上是二战胜利国给战败国套上的法律枷锁。宪章第53条规定，在对第二次世界大战侵略者进行调查之前，安理会常任理事国有权不经授权就采取制衡措施。第107条补充说，宪章并不废除或者限制二战胜利国家对于战败国在战争期间和战后所采取的处置行为。    这两条的核心逻辑非常清楚，那就是如果德国、日本等二战战败国再次走上侵略老路的话，五常就可以跳过安理会直接采取行动。    日本对这套条款始终耿耿于怀，废除“敌国条款”是它十多年的核心诉求。1957年是日本加入联合国的第二年，此时的日方就打起了修改条款的心思。

E | 冷战期间宪章修订被搁置，日本无法实施；冷战结束之后，日本利用联合国改革和争取常任理事国席位的机会，多次提出废除提案。    返回，查看更多。

Current article:http://mltti.ninyakenhongnian.sbs/t7z/3w8j.html

Published on:08:55:50